We endogenize …rms'organizational structures in a homogenous goods duopoly where …rms invest in cost reducing R&D and compete in quantities, and examine their impact on R&D e¤orts and market performance. Each …rm's owner can either delegate to a manager both market competition and R&D investment decisions (Full Delegation strategy) or delegate the market competition decision alone (Partial Delegation strategy). We show that when the initial marginal cost is relatively high, Universal Full Delegation emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, an asymmetric equilibrium with one owner choosing a Full Delegation strategy and the other a Partial Delegation strategy arises. Finally, Universal Partial Delegation can arise in equilibrium only if competition is in prices.
Introduction
The contribution of technological change to economic growth is incontestable. Makri et al. (2006) presents empirical evidence revealing that more than 50% of the economic growth during 1945-2002 in the U.S. is accredited to R&D investments within the high-technology sector.
Moreover, during 2000-2006, the 10 largest U.S. companies increased their R&D spending by 42%. 1 In addition, numerous empirical studies reveal that innovation in the form of development of new products and cost reducing processes facilitates …rms to achieve a competitive advantage in the market in which they operate. 2 Stylized facts indicate that modern corporations are characterized by separation of ownership and management (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983, Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . A large body of the theoretical literature on delegation analyzes the incentives of owners to strategically delegate decisions to their managers that lead away from pro…t maximization. A leading model within this literature is the VFJS model 3 which assumes that owners o¤er a sales bonus to their managers in order to in ‡uence the behavior of rival …rms in their favor. Recently, researchers have focussed their attention on the investigation of the proper incentives for managers that foster …rms'R&D investments. 4 This paper aims to investigate the relation between strategic managerial contracts, innovation and …rm performance in a market in which owners choose their …rms' organizational structure. In particular, each …rm's owners choose whether they will delegate both R&D investments and market competition decisions to their manager (Full Delegation strategy), or they will delegate only market competition decisions to him (Partial Delegation strategy). More speci…cally, we address the following questions: Which are the e¤ects of alternative con…gu-rations of organizational structures on the …rms'R&D investments and market performance?
Which organizational structure will …rms' owners select in equilibrium? Do we expect delegation of R&D decisions to be a widespread strategy in real world markets? What are the welfare e¤ects of each con…guration of organizational structures? Are the market and societal incentives aligned?
To do so, we consider a homogenous Cournot duopoly. We follow the VFJS model, with one important departure. Owners, besides output decisions, can delegate R&D investment decisions to their managers as well. In particular, we consider a four-stage basic game with observable actions. In the …rst stage, …rms'owners decide whether to follow a Full Delegation (F D), or a Partial Delegation (P D) strategy. If an owner chooses F D, he makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er to his manager specifying the incentive parameter for both the R&D and output decisions.
Otherwise, he takes no action. In the second stage, R&D investments are chosen by the …rms' decision making agents (a …rm's manager in case of F D or its owner in case of P D). In the third stage, if a …rm's owner has chosen P D, he makes a "take-it-or-leave-it" o¤er to his manager specifying the incentive parameter for the output decision alone. In the last stage, managers compete in quantities. We also consider a pre-play game in which in stage 0, …rms' owners announce (and precommit) to the delegation strategies that they will follow in the future.
In this context, the …rms'organizational structures arise endogenously as a consequence of managers, who are directed to be more aggressive than strict pro…t maximization, decide over R&D investments, while R&D decisions are taken by pro…t maximizing owners under Universal P D: In addition, under the Asymmetric Delegation con…guration, the …rm that chooses the F D strategy becomes leader in incentives, and thus, invests more in R&D and obtains higher pro…ts than any …rm in the Universal F D and P D con…gurations and also than its rival …rm that chooses the P D strategy. Moreover, the …rms' pro…ts are higher under the Universal F D than under the Universal P D con…guration as long as …rms endowed initially with an e¢ cient technology. There is scant empirical evidence on the relation between R&D e¤orts and delegation schemes which is mixed. Our results are partially in line with a strand of the literature that establishes a positive relation between managerial incentives departing from strict pro…t maximization with …rms R&D investments (Makri et al. 2006 ; Lin et al. 2010 ). 6 Regarding the equilibrium con…guration of organizational structures, we …nd that the Universal P D is never an equilibrium con…guration. In the basic game, the Universal F D con…g-uration arises in equilibrium, but only if the initial marginal cost is high enough. Otherwise, the asymmetric delegation is an equilibrium con…guration. Surprisingly, we show that ex-ante symmetric …rms may turn out to be ex-post asymmetric in all aspects, i.e., in their …nal production technologies, outputs and pro…tability. This is in line with the empirical evidence which is though limited and inconclusive. Colombo and Delmastro (2004) , examining delegation decisions in a sample of 438 Italian manufacturing …rms, report that in some cases …rms' owners delegate only short-run decisions, such as output, to their managers, while in others they delegate long-run decisions, such as R&D investments, as well.
We further show that in the pre-play game, the Universal F D is the unique equilibrium con…guration. Hence, we point out that the assumption used in the literature about the existence of a pre-play game stage in which …rms' owners announce and precommit to the delegation strategies that they will follow in the future is not innocuous.
Regarding welfare, we show that all organizational structure con…gurations lead to higher welfare than under no delegation. Moreover, that the Asymmetric con…guration leads to the highest welfare, while the Universal F D con…guration leads to the lowest welfare. As a consequence, market and societal incentives are not always aligned.
Finally, we investigate the impact of R&D spillovers, as well as of price competition, on the equilibrium market outcomes. As expected, the existence of low R&D spillovers does not alter our main …ndings. However, high spillovers may lead to reversals in the equilibrium output rankings and, more importantly, to Universal F D being the unique equilibrium con…guration.
Moreover, in contrast to quantity competition, under price competition, Universal P D arises in equilibrium for all degrees of product substitutability. In this case, managers are less aggressive than their owners and thus, a P D strategy results in higher cost reducing R&D investments, making the …rm more competitive in the market.
The contribution of our paper is two-fold. First, we contribute to the broad literature that examines the e¤ects of alternative …rms'organizational structures on the …rms'R&D investments, market outcomes and welfare, as well the endogenous emergence of these alternative organizational structures in the market. The bulk of this literature focuses on agency theory issues that neglect strategic interactions arising among oligopolistic …rms. 7 Our paper belongs to a recent branch of the literature that studies how strategic delegation of decisions from owners to managers a¤ects …rm's R&D investments and production decisions. Zhang and Zhang (1997) were the …rst to study how the separation of ownership and management a¤ects …rm's R&D investment and output decisions. 8 In a similar vein, Riegler (2006, 2008) endogenize the selection between Non-Delegation and Full Delegation, by assuming a pre-play game in which rival owners announce and precommit to their future delegation strategies. In this setup, Kopel and Riegler (2008) show that R&D spillovers do not a¤ect …rms' owners choice of organizational structure, which is to always choose Full Delegation. Our paper departs from the above literature in four ways. First, we extend the owners'strategy space by also including Partial Delegation as a possible owners'choice of organizational structure. Second, besides the pre-play game scenario considered in the literature so far, we also examine the time consistent scenario in which …rms'owners are unable to announce and precommit to the delegation strategies that they will follow in the future. Third, we investigate the welfare e¤ects of the alternative organizational structure con…gurations in the market. Fourth, we examine the e¤ects of product di¤erentiation and price competition to …rms'owners incentives to delegate R&D investments decisions to their managers. 9 In contrast to the received literature, we show that Full Delegation may not be a …rm's owners'choice of organizational structure if owners can optimally adjust their delegation strategies over time. This highlights that owners precommiting to future delegation strategies is not an innocuous assumption and has profound e¤ects for market and societal outcomes.
Second, our paper contributes to the literature that investigates the endogenous emergence of asymmetric performance among ex-ante symmetric …rms operating in the same industry. 10 In particular, our paper belongs to a strand of the literature that considers di¤erences in 
2007, 2009
). In the absence of R&D investments, their main …nding is that ex ante symmetric …rms perform equally in equilibrium, because …rms'owners choose the same incentive contract to induce a more aggressive behavior of their managers in the market. Instead, by including R&D investments and Partial Delegation in the …rm's spectrum of decisions, we show that asymmetric equilibria could arise in which some …rms choose not to delegate all decisions to their managers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. In Section 3, the alternative organizational structure con…gurations are analyzed and compared among them. Section 4 investigates the conditions under which alternative organizational structure con…gurations arise in equilibrium. Section 5 conducts a welfare analysis. Section 6 discusses price competition, while Section 7 examines the robustness of our main results in the presence of R&D spillovers. Finally, Section 8 provides some concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model
We consider a homogenous good industry in which two …rms, denoted by i, j = 1; 2; with i 6 = j, compete in quantities. The inverse demand function for the good is P (Q) = 1 Q, Firm i's pro…ts are:
Each …rm i has an owner and a manager. Following Fershtman and Judd (1987) , "owner" is a decision maker whose objective is to maximize the …rm's pro…ts, while "manager" is an agent hired by the owner to make decisions on a spectrum of tasks. 13 Each …rm's owner can compensate his manager by o¤ering a "take-it-or-leave-it" incentive contract to him. 14 The incentive contract structure is assumed to take a particular form. The risk-neutral manager i is paid at the margin, in proportion to a linear combination of own pro…ts and own sales. 15 In particular, the manager of …rm i is given an incentive to maximize:
where i and R i are …rm i's pro…ts and revenues respectively, 16 and a i ; a i 1; is the managerial incentive parameter. Observe that if a i = 1, manager i's behavior coincides with owner i's objective for strict pro…t-maximization. If a i < 1, …rm i's manager moves away from strict pro…t-maximization towards including consideration of sales and thus, he becomes a more aggressive seller in the market. Hence, the lower the managerial incentive parameter set by owner i is, the higher is the aggressiveness of his manager.
Each …rm i's owner can delegate either both the R&D investment and output decisions to his manager (Full Delegation strategy, F D), or the output decision alone (Partial Delegation strategy, P D). In the latter case, the R&D decision is taken by the owner himself. 17;18 In order to investigate the delegation strategies that …rms'owners are expected to follow in equilibrium, as well as the e¤ects of such strategies on market outcomes, we consider a basic game and a pre-play game.
The basic game is a four-stage game with observable actions. The sequence of moves unravels as follows:
Each …rm i's owner can make an o¤er of a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract to his manager specifying the incentive parameter for both the R&D and output decisions, a We also consider a pre-play game with observable actions. In the latter game, we add a Stage 0 to the basic game.
Stage 0: Each …rm i's owner announces (and precommits to) the delegation strategy that will follow in the continuation of the game. More speci…cally, announcing an F D strategy implies that the …rm i's owner plans to choose the incentive parameter for his manager a 
Delegation Strategy Con…gurations
In this section we analyze the alternative delegation strategy con…gurations that may arise in equilibrium. Due to symmetry, these con…gurations reduce to the following three: Universal Full It should be noted that the "Non-Delegation" con…guration, (N; N ); (i.e., when R&D and output decisions are taken by …rms'owners), corresponds to the special case in which a
We brie ‡y discuss this as a benchmark case. 20 Firms' owners …rst decide on their R&D expenditures and then choose their outputs. Firm i's reaction function in the output competition stage is,
: The respective one in the R&D investments stage is,
. Observe that both …rms'outputs and R&D investments are strategic substitutes. Equilibrium output, R&D investments, and pro…ts are, respectively:
Turning to our main analysis, the last stage of the game is common across all three delegation strategy con…gurations. Each …rm i's manager sets output to maximize (2) . From the …rst order condition, the reaction function of manager i is:
Manager i thus perceives a i (c x i ) as its …rm's marginal production cost, which is lower than the true marginal cost for all a i < 1. The lower the incentive parameter that owner i sets, the lower is the marginal cost that manager i perceives and thus, the more aggressive he becomes in the output setting game. Solving the system of …rst order conditions, …rm i's output is:
The following observations are in order. First,
i.e., the lower the incentive parameter that owner i sets, the higher is the aggressiveness of his manager and thus the higher is …rm i's output. In contrast, 
Universal Full Delegation (F D; F D)
Consider …rst the Universal F D con…guration. 21 In the third stage there is no action. In the second stage, each manager i invests in R&D so as to maximize his objective function, which using (4) can be written as: i as its …rm's R&D costs, which are lower than the …rm i's true R&D costs as long as a i < 1: Hence, in this case, not only the marginal production cost, but also the R&D costs of the …rm are "discounted"by a factor equal to the incentive parameter set by its owner. The lower the latter is, the lower are the …rm's R&D costs that manager i perceives and thus the more aggressive manager i becomes in the R&D setting game.
From the …rst order condition, 22 the reaction function of manager i is:
It is easy to see that for all 0 < a i 1;
; that is, rival …rms'R&D e¤orts are strategic substitutes (as in the Non-Delegation case). The higher is the rival …rm's R&D investment level, the lower is the R&D e¤ort that manager i undertakes. Further, it can be checked that under Assumption 1, when a i = a j the manager i's R&D reaction function is always steeper and is an outward shift of the respective owner i's in the Non-Delegation case.
Solving the system of …rst order conditions, …rm i's R&D investments are:
It can be checked that under Assumption 1,
Clearly, a more aggressive manager i (lower a i ) chooses a higher R&D e¤ort because he perceives his …rm's R&D costs to be lower. Moreover, the higher is a j , and thus the less aggressive is manager j, the higher are the incentives of manager i to spend on R&D because in this case, its …rm is expected to produce a relatively higher output. This is the well-known in the literature output e¤ect (see e.g., Bester and Petrakis, 1993). The above observations reveal that owners may strategically choose the incentive parameters for their managers in the …rst stage in order each to in ‡uence his rival manager's choice of R&D e¤ort. In fact, by directing its manager towards a more aggressive behavior, owner i may discourage manager j from spending on his …rm's R&D activities.
In the …rst stage, each owner i makes an o¤er of a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract to his manager specifying the incentive parameter a i ; so as to maximize pro…ts
The latter can be obtained by substituting (7) into (5) and (1). Each manager then accepts the o¤er, as it satis…es his participation constraint. From the …rst order condition, the reaction function of owner i is:
e., managerial incentives are strategic substitutes. As owner j directs his manager towards a relatively less aggressive behavior, the rival owner manipulates his manager's behavior in the opposite direction in order to push him towards higher R&D e¤ort and output and in this way, to increase …rm i's market share and pro…ts.
Exploiting symmetry, the equilibrium managerial incentive parameter is:
where = q 512(9r 2) 96rc(9r 28)(9r 2) + 9r 2 c 2 [784 + 9r(225r 424)].
It can be checked that under Assumption 1, 0 < a > 0: The higher are the …rms'marginal production and R&D costs, the more reluctant are their owners to direct their managers to more aggressive behavior. This is so because the ensuing pro…ts from delegation are lower in this case.
From (9), we get respectively each …rm's equilibrium R&D investments, output and pro…ts:
Universal Partial Delegation (P D; P D)
We next consider the Universal Partial Delegation con…guration. In the third stage, each owner i makes an o¤er of a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract to his manager specifying the incentive parameter a i ; so as to maximize pro…ts. The latter from (7), and after some manipulations, can be written as:
. Each manager then accepts the o¤er, as it satis…es his participation constraint. From the …rst order condition, 24 the reaction function of owner i is:
Note that
As above, managerial incentives are strategic substitutes. Reacting to owner j who directs his manager towards a less aggressive behavior, owner i makes his manager more aggressive so that the latter increases his …rm's output and pro…ts.
Solving the system of …rst order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium incentive parameters,
Observe that
When …rm i's R&D investment increases, and thus its marginal cost decreases, the owner i has incentives to direct his manager to a more aggressive behavior in the output setting stage. This is so because a more e¢ cient …rm has relatively more to gain by expanding its own output and thus forcing its rival to drastically reduce its output.
For a similar reason, when the rival …rm j becomes more e¢ cient (higher x j ), …rm i's output expansion is not too rentable and thus owner i directs his manager to a less aggressive behavior.
This discussion reveals that owners may invest on R&D strategically in stage two in order to in ‡uence the incentive parameters choices in stage three. Indeed, owner i may invest relatively more on R&D in order to prevent his rival owner from making his manager too aggressive.
In the third stage there is no action. In the second stage, owners simultaneously set their R&D investments so as to maximize their pro…ts, which after some manipulations, can be written as:
From the …rst order condition, 25 the reaction function of owner i is:
Note that as above, R&D investments are strategic substitutes (
exploiting symmetry, we obtain the equilibrium R&D investments:
Finally, each …rm's equilibrium incentive parameter, output, and pro…ts are, respectively:
It can be checked that 0 a P D
Note that
As in the case of Universal Full Delegation, here too owners are more reluctant to make their managers aggressive when their production and R&D costs become higher.
Asymmetric Delegation Con…guration (F D; P D)
We …nally turn to the Asymmetric Delegation con…guration case. Without loss of generality, assume that owner 1 follows the F D strategy and owner 2 the P D one. In the third stage, owner 2 makes an o¤er of a "take-it-or-leave-it"contract to his manager specifying the incentive parameter a 2 ; so as to maximize pro…ts that, as above, are given by
. Manager 2 then accepts the o¤er, as it satis…es his participation constraint. From the …rst order condition, the incentive parameter of owner 2 is:
Observe that owner 2, who is follower in setting the managerial incentive, optimally reacts to a more aggressive behavior chosen by the leader owner 1 for his manager, by directing his manager to a less aggressive behavior ( In the second stage, manager 1 and owner 2 choose R&D investment levels, so as the former to maximize his objective and the latter its …rm's pro…ts, which are respectively,
From the …rst order conditions, the reaction functions of manager 1 and owner 2 are, respectively:
Note that R&D investments are again strategic substitutes, i.e.,
an increase in manager 1's aggressiveness (a lower a 1 set by his owner in the …rst stage) has a negative impact on the rival …rm 2's R&D investments and a positive impact on own R&D investments. Clearly, a more aggressive manager 1 will increase its …rm's R&D investments. On the other hand, the rival owner 2 will decrease R&D expenditures since he expects a signi…cant output contraction for his …rm, that would result from the more aggressive manager 1's output setting in the last stage.
Solving the …rst order conditions, …rms'R&D investments are:
It can be checked that
> 0: This is in line with our discussion above and con…rms that owner 1 may strategically choose his managers'incentives in order to reduce its rival's manager R&D spending.
In the …rst stage, owner 1 makes an o¤er of a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract to his manager specifying the incentive parameter a 1 ; so as to maximize his pro…ts which can be written as:
Manager 1 then accepts the o¤er, as it satis…es his participation constraint. From the …rst order condition, we obtain the equilibrium incentive parameter for manager 1:
Substituting (19) into (18) and these into (16), we get the equilibrium incentive parameter for manager 2: 
It can be checked that 0 < a < 0: Intuitively, as the R&D technology becomes more e¤ective (lower r), the leader in setting managerial incentives owner 1 directs his manager to be more aggressive. Then, as stated above, the follower owner 2 reacts by setting a less aggressive behavior for his manager.
Finally, each …rm's equilibrium R&D investments, output, and pro…ts are: 
It can easily be checked that …rm 1's R&D investments, output and pro…ts are higher than the respective ones of …rm 2; i.e., x
The leader in setting managerial incentives owner 1 directs his manager to a more aggressive behavior and thus his manager chooses both R&D e¤ort and output higher than those of …rm 2. As a result, …rm 1's pro…ts are higher than those of …rm 2:
By comparing the equilibrium values of R&D investments, managerial incentive parameters, output and pro…ts across the three alternative delegation con…gurations, the following Proposition results.
Proposition 1 Comparing the Asymmetric Delegation con…guration with the Universal Full
Delegation and the Universal Partial Delegation con…gurations, the following inequalities hold:
, with 
We …rst discuss the comparison between the two symmetric delegation con…gurations and Turning to the comparison of the asymmetric delegation con…guration with the symmetric ones, the intuition behind Proposition 1(i-iv) goes as follows. Now the leader in setting managerial incentives, owner 1, directs his manager to a more aggressive behavior than under any of the two symmetric delegation con…gurations. Thus, manager 1 chooses relatively higher levels of R&D e¤ort and output. In contrast, and as discussed above, the follower in setting managerial incentives owner 2 reacts by choosing to invest less in R&D and by setting a lower level of aggressiveness for his manager than under Universal F D or P D; manager 2;
in turn, chooses a relatively lower level of output. As a consequence, the leader in incentives …rm 1 "dominates"the market and earns higher pro…ts than any …rm under the two symmetric delegation con…gurations, while the opposite is true for the follower in incentives …rm 2. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the level of managerial aggressiveness set by owner 1 is so high (remember that a A 1 could even be negative) that results in higher industry R&D expenditures and industry output, yet lower industry pro…tability, in the asymmetric case, as compared with both symmetric delegation con…gurations (Proposition 1(v-vii)).
Finally, one can easily check that all delegation con…gurations lead to higher industry R&D investments and output than under the benchmark case of non-delegation. 27 Then, due to a more intense competition under delegation, industry pro…tability is lower than under nondelegation. In fact, even the leader in managerial incentives …rm 1 obtains lower pro…ts than any …rm in the non-delegation case.
Equilibrium Delegation Con…gurations
The literature so far has considered only symmetric delegation con…gurations. More importantly, it has assumed that rival owners are able to announce (and precommit to) the delega-tion strategies that they will follow in the future. In this literature, all …rms choose either the Full Delegation strategy or the Partial Delegation strategy. This is however in contrast to the empirical evidence (Colombo and Delmastro 2004) , that indicates that these two delegation strategies often coexist in the same industry. As we demonstrate below, the assumption that owners announce and precommit to speci…c delegation contracts is not innocuous. By relaxing this assumption and allowing only for time consistent …rms' strategies, the Asymmetric Delegation con…guration may arise in equilibrium under very plausible conditions.
The Pre-play Game
Following the bulk of the literature, in this subsection we investigate the equilibrium delegation con…gurations under the assumption that …rms' owners announce (and precommit to) their delegation strategies. This is re ‡ected in the pre-play game in which, in Stage 0, …rms'owners choose between the F D and P D strategy (before they set their respective incentive parameters in Stage 1 and Stage 3, respectively). Table 1 provides the owners' pro…ts in the ensuing in Stage 0 2 2 matrix game.
<<PUT TABLE 1 HERE>>
An immediate consequence of Proposition 1(iv) is that the Full Delegation strategy strictly dominates the Partial Delegation strategy. In particular, if owner i chooses the P D strategy, then the best response of the rival …rm's owner is to choose the F D strategy (
In this way, he becomes leader in setting managerial incentives and increases his …rm's market share and pro…ts. At the same time, if owner i chooses the F D strategy, then the best response of the rival owner is to choose the F D strategy as well. Otherwise, the latter becomes follower in setting managerial incentives and obtains relatively lower pro…ts ( This …nding is in line with empirical evidence revealing that contracts that combine own pro…ts and sales are widely adopted in …rms with high R&D investments (Daroca and Nourayi
2008; and Duru and Iyengar 1999). In addition, it con…rms the main result of Zhang and
Zhang (1997) and Riegler (2006, 2008) in case that …rms'owners have an additional strategy, the P D strategy, in their disposition.
The Basic Game
In this subsection we relax the assumption that there is a Stage 0 in which owners announce (and precommit to) their future delegation strategies. We thus turn to the equilibrium analysis of the basic game. As is standard in this type of games, we …rst propose a candidate equilibrium delegation con…guration, and then check whether it survives all possible deviations. 28 The three delegation con…gurations analyzed in Section 3 are candidate equilibria that should be tested against all possible deviations. In particular, regarding the Universal (ii) If c c A (r) the Asymmetric Delegation is an equilibrium con…guration.
(iii) The Universal Partial Delegation is never an equilibrium con…guration. mixed strategies, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
<<PUT FIGURE 2 HERE>>
It is worth stressing that Proposition 3 is in line with the empirical evidence provided by Colombo and Delmastro (2004) that shows that the two delegation strategies often coexist in equilibrium.
The intuition behind Proposition 3(i) goes as follows. If the initial marginal cost is relatively high, a …rm's owner has no incentives to switch to a P D strategy, because by non-delegating R&D e¤ort to an aggressive manager, his …rm's R&D expenditures will be seen reduced. In turn, his manager will be put in a relatively disadvantageous position in the output setting stage, not only due to the …rm's higher marginal cost, but also because as a follower in setting managerial incentives owner will typically direct his manager to a relatively less aggressive behavior. In contrast, if the initial marginal cost is low enough, the deviant owner will typically direct his manager to a more aggressive behavior in the output setting game. The latter positive e¤ect more than compensates the negative e¤ect due to the relatively higher marginal cost of the deviant …rm, resulting from its lower R&D expenditures. Note also that the deviant owner saves on R&D costs too. The overall e¤ect for the deviant owner turns out to be positive. Thus, (F D; F D) cannot be sustained in equilibrium for low enough c:
As regards Proposition 3(ii), the intuition goes as follows. We have seen that in the Asymmetric Delegation con…guration, owner 1 directs his manager to be too aggressive, i.e., a A 1 is quite low and could be negative for low values of c. As managerial incentive parameters are strategic substitutes, the deviant owner 2 will respond by directing his manager to be less aggressive, in particular when the initial marginal cost is relatively low. As a consequence, the outcome of the resulting Universal Full Delegation deviation game will be quite biased, both in terms of R&D e¤orts and outputs, against the deviant owner 2. Hence, his deviation pro…ts will be low and there will be no incentives to deviate from a P D to an F D strategy. The opposite reasoning applies when the initial marginal cost is relatively high, in which case there are always deviation incentives for owner 2:
Finally, regarding Proposition 3(iii), the reasoning is along the lines of that o¤ered when comparing the asymmetric and symmetric delegation con…gurations (see Section 3). There are strong incentives to become a leader in setting managerial incentives and thus, (P D; P D) can never arise as an equilibrium con…guration.
Welfare Analysis
In this section, we examine the welfare implications of the alternative delegation con…gurations and also compare with the total welfare in the benchmark Non-Delegation case.
Total welfare is de…ned as:
where 
Proposition 4 indicates that strategic delegation improves welfare relative to the benchmark case of Non-Delegation. This is so because delegation intensi…es market competition, and thus, consumer surplus is always higher than under Non-Delegation. The increase in consumer surplus more than compensates for the decrease in …rms'pro…ts due to stronger competition, and thus, total welfare is higher than under Non-Delegation.
Moreover, Proposition 4 informs us that the Asymmetric Delegation con…guration leads to the highest welfare. This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1. As we saw, industry output is higher under Asymmetric Delegation than under any of the two symmetric delegation con…gurations (Proposition 1(vi)). As a result, consumer surplus is also higher in this case.
The increase in consumer surplus more than compensates for the decrease in the pro…tability of the …rms which, according to Proposition 1(vii), is always lower under the Asymmetric than under any symmetric delegation con…guration. Finally, it follows from Proposition 4 that market and social incentives are not always aligned. The Asymmetric Delegation con…guration which is socially preferable emerges in equilibrium but only if the initial marginal cost is relatively low. In contrast, if the initial marginal cost is high enough, the Universal Full Delegation that emerges in equilibrium is the least preferable delegation con…guration from the social point of view.
Price competition
In this section we consider how our main results may change if alternatively we assume that …rms compete in prices, instead of quantities. We built upon the framework of Section 2 with one important departure, we assume that …rms produce di¤erentiated products. In particular,
we assume that each …rm faces the following (inverse) demand function: p i = 1 q i q j ; i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j, where 2 [0; 1] is the degree of product substitutability. Namely, a higher implies higher product substitutability and thus, a more intense market competition among competing brands. For tractability, and without loss of generality, we assume that r = 5. Thus we assume that each …rm produces one brand of a di¤erentiated good and faces the following demand function:
i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j.
29
In this context, we recon…rm the VFJS prediction that, in contrast to quantity competition, …rms'owners under price competition set managerial incentives that correspond to penalizing sales; equivalently, they optimally choose a i > 1 under all circumstances (see (2) ). Further, our …ndings indicate that Universal Partial Delegation is the unique equilibrium delegation con…guration, independently of whether …rms'goods are poor or close substitutes or whether …rms'owners are able to commit, or not, to their delegation strategies. The intuition behind this result is that since owners are now more aggressive than their managers (recall that, a i > 1), choosing the P D strategy results in higher cost reducing R&D investments. This allows …rms to become more competitive in the market, and thus earn higher pro…ts than when choosing the F D strategy. 30 
R&D Spillovers
Throughout the paper we have assumed that there are no R&D spillovers. Let us now examine how our main results may change in the presence of R&D spillovers. Following Zhang and Table 2 reports a sample of our simulations for c = :5 and = :05; :5; and :95;
i.e., for the cases of low, intermediate and high spillovers, respectively. 31 Our simulations indicate that, for relatively low spillovers, most of our main results are qualitatively similar to those under no spillovers. In particular, Propositions 1 and 2 hold intact (see Table 2 which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. This is in contrast to the case of no spillovers where multiple equilibria arise under some values of c (see Figure 1 ).
On the other hand, for intermediate levels of spillovers there are a few ranking reversals regarding Proposition 1. For instance, managers invest more in R&D under the Universal F D con…guration comparing to all other con…gurations, leading to lower output and higher pro…ts than under the Universal P D con…guration (see Table 2 Table   2 for = :95). Proposition 2 holds also for high . Interestingly, regarding Proposition 3, in this case there is a unique equilibrium, the Universal F D con…guration equilibrium.
<<PUT TABLE 2 HERE>>
Conclusions
We have investigated the relation between strategic managerial incentives, innovation and …rm performance in a duopolistic market in which …rms'organizational structures are endogenous.
We have identi…ed conditions under which …rms'owners delegate both long-run decisions (such as cost reducing R&D expenditures) and short-run decisions (such as output or prices) to their managers, as well as those conditions under which they delegate only short-run decisions. We have thus obtained the equilibrium organizational structure con…gurations that arise in the market under various circumstances.
We have shown that overall industry R&D expenditures are the highest when …rms'owners select di¤erent organizational structures in a Cournot homogenous good market. That is, when one …rm's owners choose to delegate both R&D and output decisions to their manager, while the rival's owners delegate only the output decision to their managers. This Asymmetric Delegation con…guration arises in equilibrium whenever the …rms'initial production technology is e¢ cient (initial marginal cost is low). In this case, ex-ante identical …rms end up being ex-post asymmetric in terms of their R&D e¤ort, output and pro…ts. Further, we have identi…ed conditions under which symmetric delegation con…gurations emerge in equilibrium. In particular Universal P D arises in equilibrium under Bertrand competition.
We have also demonstrated that market and societal incentives are not always aligned. While welfare is higher under an Asymmetric Delegation con…guration in the Cournot homogenous goods case, the equilibrium con…guration is Universal F D as long as the initial production tech-nologies are relatively ine¢ cient. Finally, our main results remain robust under the existence of R&D spillovers, provided that these spillovers are relatively low. Otherwise, in the existence of high level of R&D spillovers Universal F D may be the only equilibrium con…guration.
Our …ndings provide some guidelines for future empirical research on the e¤ects of …rms' owners managerial incentives on oligopolistic …rms'innovation investments and market performance, which is so far scant and inconclusive. Empirical analyses should start with a detailed study e.g. in high technology industries, regarding the e¤ects of the use of managerial contracts as an incentive mechanism to increase R&D investments. A number of testable hypotheses arises from our analysis. For instance, R&D investments and pro…tability are expected to be higher in …rms that strategically delegate innovation decisions to their managers, o¤ering them incentives to depart from strict pro…t maximization. Another testable hypothesis is that the probability of a …rm delegating R&D investments to non pro…t maximizing managers is lower when the …rms are initially endowed with e¢ cient production technologies.
Our analysis was carried out in a duopolistic market structure with speci…c functional suggestions. Financial support (Project INV-2011-45) , while the second author was visiting the Economics Department at Universitat Jaume I, is gratefully acknowledged. Full responsibility for all shortcomings is ours.
Proof of Proposition 1
By comparing the equilibrium managerial incentive parameters under the Universal F D and P D con…gurations, given by (9) and (15), it can be checked that a F D > a P D always. Further, by comparing the respective equilibrium R&D investments, given by (10) and (14), it can be checked that x F D > x P D always. Turning to the equilibrium outputs under Universal F D and P D;given by (10) and (15), it can be checked that q F D > q P D if and only if c < b c q (r). Finally, by comparing the respective equilibrium pro…ts, given by (10) and (15), it can be checked that F D > P D if and only if c < b c (r). By comparing equilibrium managerial incentive parameters in the Asymmetric Delegation con…guration, given by (19) and (20), with those under Universal F D and P D, it can be checked that a
Further, by comparing the respective equilibrium R&D investments (see (21) ), it can be checked that x
always. Turning to equilibrium outputs and pro…ts (see (21) and (22)), it can be veri…ed that q
2 under all parameter values. Finally, by comparing industry output and pro…ts in the Asymmetric Delegation con…guration with the respective ones under Universal F D and P D, it can be checked that (18), and using (16), (4) and (1), the deviant …rm j's pro…ts turn out to be: (ii) The (P D; P D) candidate equilibrium: Again we need to consider only one deviation. If owner j expects that owner i will follow a P D strategy and choose the incentive parameter for his manager in Stage 3, he will follow the same strategy and obtain P D pro…ts only if he does not have incentive to switch to an F D strategy and set the incentive parameter for his manager in Stage 1. In this case, the deviation game unravels as follows. In Stage 1, owner j sets a j ; and in Stage 2, manager j and owner i chose their …rms'R&D expenditures. In Stage 3, owner i sets a i , and in the …nal stage managers engage in output competition. Clearly, the deviation game is the same as the asymmetric delegation con…guration game with j = 1 and i = 2: This is so because owner i knows the whole history of actions (a 1 ; x 1 ; x 2 ) while setting a i and, moreover, owner j anticipates that owner i will optimally react to this history. An immediate consequence of Proposition 1(iv) is that
is never an equilibrium con…guration.
(iii) The (F D; P D) candidate equilibrium: Here we need to consider two deviations using similar reasoning as above. In brief, …rst, owner 1 may deviate from an F D to a P D strategy; and second, owner 2 may deviate from a P D to an F D strategy. The …rst deviation game unravels as follows. In stage 1, there is no action. In Stage 2, owners choose their …rms'R&D expenditures, in Stage 3 they set their managers'incentive parameters and in Stage 4 managers choose output. Clearly, this deviation game is identical to the Universal Partial Delegation game. Since owner 1 takes no action in Stage 1, it becomes common knowledge that he will set the incentive parameter in Stage 3. Proposition 1(iv) implies that owner 1 has no incentives to deviate because the deviant pro…ts are P D ; which are always lower than his pro…ts A 1 in the Asymmetric Delegation game.
In the second deviation game, owner 1 sticks to the F D strategy and sets a 1 = a A 1 ; since he expects his rival owner to follow the P D strategy and thus set the managerial incentive parameter in Stage 3. However, the deviant owner 2 sets instead the incentive parameter for his manager in Stage 1, optimally responding to a 3 The strategic use of managerial incentive contracts has been introduced by Vickers (1985) , Fershtman (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (or the VFJS model). In these papers, each …rm's owner has the option to compensate his manager with an incentive contract combining own pro…ts and sales or revenues, in order to direct him to a more aggressive behavior in the market. This can be justi…ed on the grounds of empirical studies, which suggest that CEO compensation is positively associated with both pro…t and sales (Baker et al., 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lambert et al., 1991 ). For instance, industry level analyses suggest that contracts of this type are widely adopted in the CEO compensation practice in U.S. markets with high R&D investments such as in "new economy" …rms (Daroca and Nourayi, 2008) . 5 It is straightforward from the VFJS model that, for given technologies, delegation of decisions from owners to managers is always a dominant strategy. Henceforth, cases in which an owner delegates no decisions to his manager and sticks to pure pro…t maximization are not considered here. The (Non-Delegation, Non-Delegation) con…guration is analyzed only as a benchmark case in Section 3. 6 Others support, however, that the alliance between managerial incentives and pro…t maximization is bene…cial for …rms R&D investments and market performance (Milkovich, et al. 1991 Röller and Sinclair-Desgagni (1996) for an excellent review. 11 In the basic model we assume away R&D spillovers. In section 7, in the spirit of Zhang and Zhang (1997) and Riegler (2006, 2008) , we study the impact of R&D spillovers on our main results. 12 i.e., that (i) the second order conditions and stability conditions are satis…ed and (ii) that equilibrium marginal cost, output, R&D expenditures and pro…ts are always positive. 13 As is common practice in the strategic delegation literature, moral hazard issues that may arise in this context are ignored. The emphasis is instead put on strategic interactions aspects that are rending credible nonstrictly pro…t maximizing strategies which managers can employ, and which the owners themselves are unable to follow. See Vickers (1985) , Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987) 14 A standard assumption in the strategic delegation literature is that …rms' owners have all the bargaining power during negotiations with their managers and they thus o¤er "take-it-or-leave-it" incentive contracts to their managers that leave them with their reservation value. 15 The assumption of risk neutral managers is standard in the strategic delegation literature (See for instance, Vickers1985 ; Fershtman 1985; Fershtman and Judd 1987; Sklivas 1987; and Miller and Pazgal 2001 . In contrast to risk-neutral managers, risk-averse managers react less to the incentives set by the owners, i.e., they stick to a behavior closer to pro…t maximization. Then owners have lower ability to manipulate their managers by using appropriate incentive schemes.
16 Following Fershtman and Judd (1987) , M i is not the manager's reward in general. Since the manager's reward is linear in pro…ts and sales, he is paid A i + B i M i for some constants A i , B i , with B i > 0. As the manager is risk-neutral, he acts so as to maximize M i and the values of A i and B i are then irrelevant. These values are then selected in such a way that the manager´s participation constraint is satis…ed. 17 For a related analysis regarding Partial delegation, see also Lambertini and Primavera (2001) and Lo-er (2011). 18 An owner could delegate only the R&D decision to his manager, keeping the output decision for himself. However, this alternative Partial Delegation strategy turns out to be strictly dominated by the Full Delegation strategy and thus never arises in equilibrium (The proof is available from the authors upon request). To keep the analysis as simple as possible, we do not include this alternative P D strategy in the basic model. 19 The timing of the game re ‡ects common real business practices where …rms …rst decide over their long-run plans (such as R&D expenditures) and, according to them, decide simultaneously about their short-run variables (such as quantities or prices). See, among others, Zhang and Zhang (1997) and Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2005). 20 It is well-known in the literature that the Non-Delegation strategy N is strictly dominated by both P D and F D strategies. Thus, w.l.o.g., we can ignore the N strategy in our analysis. Note that (N; N ) is a special case of Qiu (1997) . 21 The analysis here is as a special case of Kopel and Riegler (2008) with no R&D spillovers. 22 It can be easily checked that the second order and the stability conditions are satis…ed as long as a i > 0: 23 Moreover, it can be checked that the second order and stability conditions are satis…ed at (a F D ; a F D ). 24 It can be easily checked that the second order conditions are satis…ed. The stability conditions are also satis…ed when x i = x j :
25 It can be checked that second order and stability conditions are satis…ed. 26 In fact, b c (r) varies between 0:444637 and 0:45 and is not monotonic in r: 27 More speci…cally, x P D > x N > x A 2 , and q A 2 < q N < min[q F D ; q P D ], i.e., only the follower in incentives …rm 2 invests less and produces less than any …rm under no delegation. 28 This solution approach is the only appropriate because the owners'best response functions are discontinuous in the basic game. For instance, if owner i has chosen an F D strategy with an incentive parameter a
F D i
, the best response of owner j is either to follow an F D strategy with a ; no action) …rms'R&D investments in Stage 2. 29 To avoid corner solutions we assume that < 0:85; i.e., that the two goods are not too close substitutes. 30 We have also considered the case in which …rms produce di¤erentiated products under output competition. For a detailed analysis of this case see Mitrokostas and Petrakis (2011) . 31 The detailed analysis is available from the authors upon request. 32 This expression is too long to be included in the text. However, it is available from the authors upon request. 
